I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, international envirorunental cooperation has emerged and intensified in many areas in response to new scientific inf ormation and technological advances in pollution control. While in many cases it has not yet reached the level of legally binding conventions, the body of formal international environmental law is growing fast, as evidenced by international legislation regarding the protection of the Mediterranean 1 and the Baltic, 2 transboundary haz.ardous waste, 3 marine pollution from land-based sources, 4 the protection of the ozone layer 5 and long-range transboundary air pollution in Europe, 6 to name but a few examples. The legal framework governing these areas of international environmental relations often consists of a convention as weil as one or more protocols and/or annexes that contain detailed provisions on specific issues. As with other multilateral rreaties, most of these instruments have been negotiated within existing international organizacions.
Yet, with their enrry into force, these instroments create their own formally independent discussion fora. Contrary to ordinary multilateral treaties, all of them provide for the establishment of a confercnce of parties that mcets regularly. These conferences undertake a variety of tasks, induding the adopcion of protocols 7 and annexes, 8 the supervision of the implementation of prescriptions 9 and (though rarely in explicit form) the revision of the convention itself. 10 This wide competence contrasts with the traditional type of international agreement which provides for technical commissions to implement prescriptions while retaining the separate mechanism of diplomatic conferences for handling poütical matters, e.g., revisions or extensions of the legal framework itself 11 In the above-mentioned international environmental conventions, the distinction between political and technical issues has virtually disappeared. Given the assortment of tasks, the conferences of contracring parties are at the sarne time technical and poütical bodies.
Frequently, these conferences develop into permanent fora for the negotiation and adoption of new instruments of international law 12 or, as the case may be, for major revisions of existing ones. 13 Due to their poütical character, conferences of parties are often held at a high political -occasionally even at a ministerial 14 - level.
Regulations developed in these fora, and governing a defined area of international environrnental relations, shall be labelled international environmental 1 Stt Vicnna Convcnrion (Articlc 6, paragraph 4 (g) and (h)); Basc:l Convcnrion (A.rticlcs 15 a.nd 17). but cf.
Barcelona Convcnrion (A.rticlc 16). Significantly, thc Gcncva Convcntion dors not contain any cxplicit rulc on futurc protocols or anncxcs. This rdlcctS thc prccarious srarc of conscnsus lt rhc conclusion of rhc Envitonmntt (1989) . /ls a mattcT of principlc, thc rcvision of any protocol is thc prcrogativc of thc contracring pan:ics to thc rcspcctivc insnumcnt. In thc casc of thc rcgirnc for thc pro1cction of thc ozonc laycr, 1his lcd 10 thc cstablishmcnt of a sccond. virrual.ly indcpcndcnt mccting of 1hc confcrcncc of partics to thc Monrrcal Protocol. 8 Stt Vicnna Convcntion (Articlc 6. par:agraph 4(g)); Barcelona Convcntion (Articlc 17); P:uis Convcntion (A.rticlc 18, paragraph 4) on rcvisions of a submnrial anncx.
Convcnrion. Stt E. Choussudovsky. "&t-Wtst" Diplmrt«y for Erwironml!nt in tht Unittd Ndlions. 71tt Highln>tl Mttting witlrin tht Frarrttiwrk of ECE on tht Prottctiorr of tht
• Stt Vicnna Convcntion (Articlc 6, paragraph 4(a)); Gcncva Convcntion (Articlc 10); &sei Convcnnon (A.rticlc 15, paragraph 5); Paris Convcntion (Articlc 16, paragraph !); Barcelona Convcntion (A.rticlc 14, paragraph 2).
1° Cf provisions of thc Gcncva Convcntion (Articlc 10) with 1hosc of thc Vicnna Convcntion (Articlc 6, paragraph 4(c) and thc Basel Convcnrion (Articlc 15, paragraph S{b) and A.rriclc 17, paragraph 2).
11 During ncgoriarions on thc Convcntion for thc Protcction of thc Ozonc Laycr, discussion arosc on thc approptia1cncss of confcrring thc right 10 prcparc revisions of thc Convcnrion 10 thc confcrcncc of pan:ics. Stt UNEIYWG. 78, paragraph 23. Su abo thc formally morc rcstrictcd approach of thc Barcelona and Balric Sca Convcntions.
" For cxarnplc, undcr thc Convention on Long-rangc Transboundary Air Pollution m Europc, 1hrcc pro10-cols havc so far bccn adoptcd. In addition to thc insttumcnrs on S0 2 and NO, (sec SUF" notc 6), rhcy includc thc Pro1ocol to thc 1979 Convcnrion on Long-rangc Transboundary Air Pollution on Long-tcrm Financing of thc Co-operative Programme for thc Monitoring and Evaluation of thc Long-rangc Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europc (EMEP), 27 JIM 701 (1988 regimes. 15 A special characteristic that these regimes share is the close relationship between their normative "substance" and their decision-making procedures to implement, administer and develop prescriptions to meet the demand for quick legal action. 16 Law-making within these regimes is a quest for consensus among actors on the necessity for intemationally coordinated action. as well as on the basis for implemenring decisions to take action thus arrived at. As a result, a commonly accepted body of technical knowledge emerges within the regime. In the same fashion, a consensus on the prioriries of, and strategies for, intemationally coordinated action emerges which, in turn, produces a body of commonly accepted norms. The cognitive and normative aspects of the process are mutually reinforcing: changing knowledge demands an adaptation of normative prescriptions, whereas agreed-upon norms induce the generation of technical knowledge. Thus the conrinuous modification of international environmental law is not an intentional by-product of technological and scientific evolution. On the contrary, the pace of modification is deliberately accelerated by the mechanisms established within international environmental regimes.
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While the type of international regimes discussed in this paper 18 is based upon multilateral convenrions that tend to produce formally binding treaty law, common normative expectations at any given time are only parti.ally reflected in formal legal instruments. Owing to the slow ratification and amendment procedure of international treaties, even far-reaching decisions are frequently contained in commonly accepted interpretarions, decisions, declarations and other instruments that are below the threshold of formal international law. Moreover, international environmental regimes develop their own dispute settlement procedures within the respective issue-areas. Accordingly, dispute settlement procedures are organized consistent with the consensus-buildirtg process of communication within regimes. By intemalizing the making and application of international law within their respective issue-areas, international environmental regimes devdop into comparatively autonomous sectoral legal systems. 265-268 (1988) , who calls this a pragmatic ··m:magcmcnt approach. " " Rcfcrcncc will bc madc throughout to thc cLaboratc and cxtrcmcly dynamic international cnvironmcntal rcgimes govcming long-nnge rransboundary air pollurion in Europc and thc prorcction o( thc ozonc layer, respccrivdy.
II. SHAPING CONSENSUS
Because the international legal system lacks a centralized authority for the crearion and enforcement of law, consensus, at least among the most important actors, is necessary for the creation of new rules of international law and their adaptation to changing conditions. Usually, consensus-build.ing involves extensive negotiations. Organizing the process to shape consensus in a specific and often narrowly defined area of international relations is the most important operative function of an international regime.
A. Sha[7ing Cognitive Expectations: The Technical Dimension
"Technical" questions concerning the necessity for internationally coordinated measures, as weil as the capacity 19 of the concemed parries to act accordingly, usually form the essence of international envirorunental issues. Because of the decentralized structure of the international system, actors cannot be expected to endeavor seriously to reduce or abate a specific form of pollution of the transnational environment until the need for such usually costly action has become sufficiently clear and until they have the capacity to take remedial action. Making the technical basis for political negoriations "sufficiently clear" does not necessarily imply a high threshold of scientific evidence. Rather, at stake is the joint appraisal and interpretation of scientific findings 20 in an authoritative way within the regime, for political negotiations can set aside the considcration of scientific issues only if mutually acceptable scientific knowlcdge can be developed by a forum authorized by the participating actors. Thus, thc degree of scientific clarity is less important than the degree of unity in appraising the scientific "state of the art."
Policy questions (i.e., the deliberate setting of political goals and priorities) and questions about the "technical" basis of thcse policy decisions are often intermingled in thc bargaining proccss. Yet, to a large extent, international rcgimes address "technical" questions apart from political issues. Consider, fust, the question of the necessity for intemationally coordinated action. Within the regimes on long-range transboundary air pollution and the protection of the ozone layer, extensive consultative mechanisms forming irnportant structural parts of these institutions have been established to harmonize the interpretation and appraisal of scientific findings.
One of the comerstones of the international regime on long-range transboundary air pollution, 21 indeed its very foundation, 22 is the "European 19 On thc conccpt of "capacity" inilucncing thc proccss of cnvironmcntal politics (i.t., thc proccss of lawmlling), sec V. Prittwicz, Das Katastroplirnparad= El~te dnn Thto.Y tiu Umwrlrpolitik 107-112 (1990 Unlikc past cases involving enviroronentally adverse effects of S0 2 emissions, 23 damage to fish in Nordic lakes could not be easily traced back to emissions from nearby sources. As a first step toward intemationally agreed-upon pollution control measures, the Nordic countries had to establish the international relevance of the long-range transport of air pollutants. As long as the causal relationship between emissions in Great Britain, Germany or Poland and damage in the Nordic countries was not convincingly established, polluters could simply deny that reducing emissions would benefit acidified lakes in Scandinavia. 2 4 Starting with the base years of the protocols on sulphur dioxides {1980) and nitrogen compounds (1987) , EMEP provides tables showing annual transboundary transmission of these f'Ollutants. 2 s Thus, European governments, as weil as the public, concerned industries and interested non-governmental organizations, are now aware of the origin of acid precipitation in any given country, 26 the degree to which deposition is produced in other countries, and the primary destination of the pollutants. All calculations are based upon an intemationally accepted data processing methodology. 27 Since the appropriateness of applied modeling methods is no longer seriously contested, political negotiations are free of disputes about 22 tOnt.
•nd C.ropcmion in Europc, Sccrion on ehe Environment (14 ILM 1309 (1975 14 Thc rcvicw proccss bcgan on an informal basis almost immcdiatcly aftcr conclusion of the Ptotocol (SeptcmbcT 1987) but prior to its cntry into forcc (January 1989). Ar its firsc session (May 1989), thc confcrcncc of thc partics of thc Ptorocol took ovcr supcrvision. &t Dccision 11/3, UNEJo/OzLPto.1/5. ar
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A "scientific" panel of expertS evaluated recent calculations of the degree and rate of the depletion of the owne layer, while an "environmental" panel reviewed research on the effects of stratospheric ozone depletion on human life and the biosphere. 35 The panels reported to a working group on the revision of the Protocol. 36 Hence, even before the formal entry into force of ehe Protocol, the assessment of scientific findings by designated experts (with a view to facilitating political negotiations) was carried out within the structure of the regime.
Having been appraised by govemmental delegations within the political working group revising the Protocol, 3 7 these assessments laid an authoritative foundation for negotiations. In sum, both the long-range transboundary air pollution and protection of the ozone layer regimes establish mechanisms to develop information regarding the abatement of certain types of pollution for the purpose of facilitating political negotiations. Such information is prepared by experts in their respective fields, subject to the approval of the authorized sub-committees of the conference of parties. Thus, the above two regimes produce "in-house," i.e., on their own, a body of commonly agreed-upon technical knowledge that is widely accepted as a valid basis for political negotiarions.
However, assessment of scientific evidence is only one essential aspect of any effective, internationally coordinated strategy of pollution control. Another equally important conditioning factor is the technological capability to implement a control strategy commensurate wich the findings of the assessment process.
During the major 1990 revisions of the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convenrion, deliberations on the technological capability to reduce the consumption of ozone-depleting substances were of utmost importance. While earlier rounds of negotiations focused on the relarively easy challenge of eliminating CFCs as spray-can propellants, the new round had to address the question of idenrifying available subsritutes for more sophisticated applications of CFCs and halons. 38 As scienrific data strongly suggested the need for an accelerated rimetable for the reduction and eventual phase-out of these substances, the margin for possible intemationally coordinated action became a function of technological capability. 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENfAL LAW
A panel of experts delivered a detailed report exploring the technological capability for substituting ozone-depleting gases. 39 The report was, in fact, prepared by representatives of the major companies involved in both the production of ozone-depleting substances and the development of substitutes. Thus, the panel's exposition of the technological capability issue irnplied also industry's acceptance of the report's proposed strategies.
Similarly, as one of the first steps in its work on nitrogen oxides (NO.), the Executive Body for the Geneva Convention decided to prepare an inventory of control technologies.
• 0 This inventory formed an important basis for negotiarions on a NOx Protocol within the political Working Group on Nitrogen Oxidcs.
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The same is also true of current work on a future protocol on volatile organic compounds (VOCs) . 42 Yet, the inventory also has direct legal implications as it provides the basis for a technical annex to the Protocol. Thus, joint assessment of the technological capability for intemationally coordinated action forms an integral part of the law-making process in both international regimes.
In more abstract terms, the purpose of this technical dimension of the lawmaking process within international environmental regimes is to build consensus primarily on the assessment of knowledge. As a body of knowledge common to all parricipants gradually builds up, actors come to "trust" calculations based upon models and rely upon inventories of control technologies developed within the regime. In the end, actors interpret (and expect others to interpret) events and occurrences in a similar way} 3 The body of technical knowledge concemed
gives rise to what may be called "cognirive expectations," i.e., expectations based on knowledge. Thus the fact that the Antarctic ozone hole is regularly reviewed within the regirne on the protection of the ozone layer4 4 implies that scientifically observed changes will have to be measured against the cxisring shared body of knowledge built up within that regime. Only this procedure will produce commonly accepted interpretations or adjustments of technical knowledge. " For rcgimes conccmcd with other isrue-areas. such information will bc: largely irrelevant and most probably will not bc considcred at all.
B. Shaping Normative Expectations: The Political Dimension
Agreements on scientific evidence and technological capability for internationally coordinated action set the bases for political choicesH about the regime's priorities,4 6 policies and strategies. International envirorunental regimes facilitate the process, in particular, by providing a permanent forum of discussion47 that lowers considerably the threshold for putting new issues on the agenda 48 and encourages negotiations on a specific instrument.
lt is important to note that, while discussion may proceed within, as well as outside, the regime's structure, authoritarive decisions can only be taken within the regime itsel( This fact has an irnportant impact on international law-making since the decision-making process within the regime becomes the focal point of a whole range of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activities. The negotiacion process that eventually Ied to the adoption of the S0 2 Protocol illustrates this relationship.
At the first session of the Executive Body Oune 1983), a number of states proposed the adoption of an instrument on S0 2 {as well as NO,) emissions. 49 During that meeting, several countries unilaterally declared their intention to reduce S0 2 emissions by at least 30% by 1993 at the latest. 50 Even though the declarations were made at the official session of the Executive Body, these Statements were hardly more than inputs of individual countries into the communicarive process involving the regime on long-range transboundary air pollution.
The purpose of these declarations is obvious: they reinforced the demand for modifying the legal status of transboundary S0 2 emissions within the regime and, at the same time, suggested a particular approach for an international regulacion of the problem. 51 Since the proposal was unsuccessful, the "30% Club" " From thc principlcs codifying thc broad ovcrall goals of a rcgime •fonc, spccific prescriprions cannot bc dcrived. Stt Krasncr, supra notc 17 at 187; Kohlcr-Koch, "Zur Empirie und Theorie intemationalor Regime" in B. Kohler-Koch, cd" &gime in dm int~matiDll<ll~n &zitlrwn~n 17, at 40 {1989 34, 35 (1983) . " This is a flat-ratc rcducnon (and not, for cxamplc, a rcgul.ation by usc) by a spccific margin (.3-0%) until a parricular datc (1993). endeavored to organize broader support for the second meeting of the Executive Body. First, the "30% Club" picked up suppon at a ministerial conference in Ottawa in March 1984 when a number of interested Western countries fonnally adopted a joint declaration whose sole purpose was to exert influence on the discussion process within the regime. 52 Second, the other countries in the regime were invited to attend a further conference in June 1984, with the aim of expanding the "30% Club."5J On that occasion, a number of Eastem European cowitries joined the "30% Club," thus providing the opportunity for the ;;;doption of a binding protocol within the structure of the regime. 54 Against this backdrop, the Executive Body established a working group to prepare a protocol on 50 2 emissions at its second session in September 1984. 55 The evolution of the ozone layer regime provides another illustracion of the function of international envirorunental regimes as focal points of a broad, legally significant communication process. In March 1989, the Council of Environmental Ministers of the European Community proclaimed a phase-out of ozone-depleting CFCs by the end of the century. This decision had been adopted in response to pressure emanaring from a series of international conferences on the protection of the ozone layer. 56 In March of that year, the British government held a ministerial levd" global conference on "Saving the Ozone Layer" which sought to broaden the support for a rapid revision of the Montreal Protocol in favor of an early phase-out of CF Cs. [n May 1989, the First Meeting Munich 1984) . 1be prcamblc of thc latcr Protocol cxprcssly rcfers to rhc Munich Confcrt"ncc, cmphasizing the dircct rdacionship of rhis Confercncc (which proccedcd outside rhat rcgime) .md thc SO, Prococol (adopted within rhac rcgime).
" P.lrrics agrccd to r..quest "that at its sccond mecring, die hccurive Body as a nutter of highcst priority adoprs a proposal for a spccific agr"ement on the reduction of annual national sulphur cmissioru or their tunsboundary fluxes by 1993 at thc latest." &t operative paragraph II of the Munich Declararion, Sum· mary Rccords of the Munich Conference. This is particularly renw-kable. since a numbcr of rcgimc counrrics had not joined thc ")()% Club" and possibly would have stayed out of thc proposcd instrument. Both thc Ottawa and the Munich Dedararions also refer to action within rhe regime with rcgard to NO, emissions.
" 1be Protocol W25 adoptcd by conscnsus at thc Executive Body's third scuion. &t ECE/EB.AIR/7, paragraph 17. Since not cvcry regime country signed the irumuncnt, its adopcion by conscnsus is rathcr significant with respect to thc regimc's law-making process. Bcsides the Protocol, a resolurion rd1ecting the posirion of thesc other states was adopted. Stt ECE/EB.AIR/7, Annex II. In general terms, the political dimension of the regime process is concemed primarily with shaping consensus on behavior. Much like the emergence-of common technical k.nowledge, a body of commonly accepted normative prescriptions, or common "normative expectations," will gradually build up within the regime. However, unlike their cognitive counterparts, normative expectations are generally resistant to change even in the face of contrafactual occurrences.
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If an actor does not behave according to common normative expectations, this fact alone will not induce a change of the relevant prescriptions and related expectations. If a country does not reach the 30% reduction goal stipulated in the S0 2 Protocol in time, the prescription nevertheless remains in force. While mechanisms for stabilizing norms against unintended change are developed, 61 this does not, of course, predude intentional modification. Given these differences, what is the relationship of the two distinct bodies of expectations developed within the limits of the regime? First, normative prescriptions governing a given issue-area are based on cognitive expectations among actors as a group. If these expectations undergo change, the related normative expectations have to be modified accordingly and prescriprions have to be adapted. The continuing adaptation of the normative framework of the international regime on the protection of the ozone layer to rapidly changing k.nowledge regarding the elements of both necessity and capacity6 2 exemplifies the dynamics of the regime. Likewise, an updated technical annex to the NO, Protocol63 containing guidelines and technical target dates, which is currently being prepared, is expected to generate normative expectations even without modification of the Protocol itself. 64 Frequently. instnunents stipulate periodic review of adopted strategies and measures in light of scientific findings and technological progress. 65 Hence, any change in relevant k.nowledge aimost automaticaIIy entails a demand for adaptation of related prescriprions. " By accepting thc "basic obligations" of thc NO, Prococol (Articlc 2. paragraphs 2a-c), states commirtcd themsclvcs eo dcvclop cmission srandards in accord wirh rhc guidclines in rhc techrucal anncx 10 rhc Prolocol.
•• Stt Articlc 6 of thc Montreal Prorocol and Articlc 5 of rhc NO, Protocol.
Second, normative prescriptions may be intended to directly affect rescarch and development conceming pollution reduction sttategies. They may indicate to addressees (e.g., a particular industty or a group of contracting states) the projected future development of a regime's body of normative prescriptions. For example, the resolution adopted by the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on the use of particular substituces for traditional CFCs was intended tosend "strong signals" to industty regarding the careful use of harmful, but still uncontrolled, substitutes as weil as the development of less problematic substances. 66 Similarly, the NO, Protocol (in addition to the targeted freeze on NO. emissions) contains a clause on the development of the "critical load" approach 67 which sets forth a scientifically supported basis for international regulation beyond the rather simple but nevertheless effective flat-rate reduction approach. If adopted, 68 ic may, in cum, be expected to be a model for future instruments negotiated within the regirne. Hence, some normative prescriptions are intended eo actively induce changes in knowledge entailing subsequent modifications of prescriptions.
Frequent changes in international environmental law cannot be considered an Wldesired disturbance of an otherwise stable body of law. On thc contrary, change and devclopment oflaw is desirable, and a continuing process that adapts normative prescriptions to changing conditions is deliberately institutionalized. lt opens up the possibility for a step-by-step approach to the claboration of a sectoral legal system. 69 For example, the reccntly adopted revision of the Montreal Protocol contains obligations to reconsider or defi.ne target dates for three groups of controlled substances in 1992 70 and the NO. Protocol, which considers the freeze on ernissions as simply "a first step," obliges contracting parties to begin negotiarions on further steps no later than six months after thc instrwnent's entry into force, and to adopt measures by 1 January 1996.
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" Stt UNEP/OzL.Pro 2/3, paragraph 51. and Annex VII on thc use of "othcr halons" and partially halogcnatcd CFCs. In this rcgard. ic is an mempc to envi"~ legal rules prior to technological dcvclopmcnts; on thc rclationship becwccn thesc two elcmcnts, sec Rudolf, "'Tcchnological Devclopment and
Codification of International Law", lL Jroi1 intemation.J <i l'hn<rt tk Sll codifoalion. E1udt1 tn l'ltonnn.r tk Robtrto Ago 433 ( 1987).
• 1 Article 1, paragraph 7 of thc NO, Prococol defincs "crirical load'" as "a quantitative cstimatc of the cxposurc to onc or more pollutants bclow which significant ~nnful cffccu on spccificd sensitive clcmcnts of thc envuonmcnt do not occur according to prcsent knowlcdgc."
" Considcrable effort is CUITcntly being dcvotcd to thc claboration of this approach. 
III. DYNAMIC LEGAL SYSTEMS

A. The Legal Structure
International environmental regimes discussed in the present paper are based on formal multilateral conventions. Fundamental obligations are codified in formal protocols and/or annexes to these convenrions. Usually, a regline's formal legal structure consists of a relatively stable framework convention with a high threshold for amendments, and protocols and/or annexes featuring a simplified amendment procedure. 72 To ease the adaptarion of this structure as necessary, a nwnber of techniques are used. For example, provision is occasionally made for amendments of the formal legal structure to enter into force for countries that fail to give timely notice of their objection.
73 Similarly, decisions to adjust control measures regarding substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol become binding on all parties to the Protocol when approved by a two-thirds majority.
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These steps tend to speed up the process of adapting legal obligations to changing cognitive expectations considerably. Nevertheless, the regulation of important aspects of the normative structure of international regimes must occur outside this body of formal treaty law.
First, diplomaric conferences are, all too often, not in a position to deal with all relevant questions relating to an adopted instrument. Relatively minor, but nevertheless important, issues are frequently excluded from an agreed "package deal" on the understanding that negotiations thereon will immediately ensue.
For example, upon the adoption of the Montreal Protocol, a resolution of the diplomatic conference requested that the Executive Director of UNEP convene a working group to prepare a report clarifying data reporting requirements.
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Based on this report, 76 the First Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol adopted decisions on the confidentiality of data and on the clarification of definitions and terms. eral treaty obligations. They were adopted by consensus and thus have become part of the normative cxpectations built up within the regime. Second, authoritarive interpretations by the permanent conferences of international regimes may close unintended gaps left open in prior negoriations. At the request of the Soviet Union, 78 the Montreal Protocol, under certain conditions, pcrmits an incrcase of producrion bcyond 1986 levels. At its first meeting, the conferencc "dccided" by consensus that such a production incrcase may not be used for export to non-parties of thc Protocol. 79 The Execurive Body for the Geneva Convention bridged a gap in the SOrProtocol in a similar fashion, i.e., by way of interpretation. Contracting parties undertake to reduce 50 2 emissions by at least 30% by 1993 at the latcst. The Protocol, however, does not address the pcriod aftcr 1993. Therefore, the Executive Body "noted a common understandi.ng among ehe Parties" 80 that an increase in such emissions after 1993 would be inconsistent with the Protocol.
Third, a permanent conferencc of parries might choose to circumvent, or evcn ignore, ccrtain provisions of ehe relevant framework convention. At the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, statcs adopted a comprehensive "Amendmcnt" to the Protocol. 81 Formally, amendmcnts to protocols enter into force after "at least two-thirds of the partics of ehe protocol concemed" have submitted eheir instruments of ratification, acccptance or approval. 82 Yet, the 1990 Amcndmcnt requires only 20 such instruments to enter into forcc, i.e., of only one-third of the parties. 83 While thc intention not to dclay thc Amendmcnt's entry into force may be understandable, 84 the approach is not sanctioncd by the language of the Convenrion. 85 Thus, states may have tacitly amended thc relevant provision of ehe Convention howcver ambiguous the formal legal foundation of this step may be.86 " Stt P. Sand, mpra norc 69 ar 6.
" Stt Dccision ll.12G lJNEIYOzl..Pto.1/5, ar 19, on thc daruiation of Attide 2, paragnph 6. Thc Dccision had bcen prcpared by ehe working group on dara rcporring. Stt UNEP/WG.Dara2/2. paragraph 2J. Fourth, equally significant is the procedure by which States at the First Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol adopted the "Ozone Depleting Potential"(OPD) figure for one of the controlled halons. Since Annex A to the Protocol called for this figure "to be determined," discussion arose on the question of whether the figure had to be inserted by way of an amendment to the Annex or whether a mere interpretation sufficed. The latter approach was chosen for the sake of simplicity.
87 Hence, the First Meeting of the Parties decided "to accept the value for the Ozone Deplcting Potential (ODP) for halon 2402 as 6,0" and to request that the Secretariat infonn thc depository that the parties agreed to accept this figure by consensus and that, accordingly, the depository should insert this figure to replace the words "tobe detennined" in Annex A to the Montreal Protocol. 88 Given the circumstances of this particular issue, a mere interpretation did not suffice. Instead, the depository had to modify the text of the annex by inscrting thc agreed-upon 6gure. Yet this was done neither according to the ordllury amendment procedure as provided for in thc Vienna Convention, nor any specific provision of the Protocol: its sole basis was the consensus among the parties to the Protocol.
Fifth, and even more surprising, is that by a simple decision the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol established an Interim Multilateral Fund to support ozone-friendly technology in developing countries. 89 Neither the framework convention nor the Protocol contains a specific legal basis for such a far-reaching step 90 which places comparatively heavy financial obligations on member states. lt is ohvious that negotiators did not consider this issue at the time the Protocol was adopted in 1987. 91 The decision, which entered into force immediately, involvcs a financial commitment of up to US$240 million for the first three-year period (1991) (1992) (1993) . The contracting parties agreed to contribute to the fund in accordance with the United Nations assessment scale. Contriburions thus must be considered virtually "mandatory," even though language of this kind was avoided. Politically, an early establishment of the funding mechanism was desirable to induce developing countries to join the Protocol and accept its obligations. The fact remains, however, that establishment of a multimillion dollar fund simply by a decision of an intergovernmental body is an intemationally unprecedented event.
17 Stt Report of the Prcpantory Group, UNEP/WG.Oata.2/3/ Rev.2" Annex II, paragraph 6. 11 Stt Dccision 11.9 of UNEWOzl..Pro.1/5, at 16. All these decisions remain below the level of formal treaty law. On the one hand, interpretations of a given tteaty adopted by the consensus of contracting states would appear tobe unproblematic; 92 on the other band, circumvention of applicable provisions of the relevant framework convention and ehe establishment of a multi-million dollar multilateral fund by decisions of the conference of the parties might be viewed as presenting a more difficult issue. 9 3 However, the eff ectiveness of all these decisions, indeed, of virtually all substantive decisions adopted so far within the two international environmental regimes discusscd, rests on consensus among the partics. 94 Regardless of any possible unccrtainty about thc legal basis and formal legal effects of thcse dccisions, they havc become part of the normative structures of thc international regimes concemed; consensual decisions will not be challenged on formal growids because negotiations bring participating states 95 to the point at which they are able and willing to accept the decisions. Thus, formal soundness may be sacrificed in cxchangc for pragmatic and swift decision-making by consensus. In short, the normative structure of a regime reflects varying degrees of formal law, 96 or, in othcr words, is only partially reflected in instruments that rise to the level of international trcaty law proper.
B. The Judicial Function
An essential component of any legal system, including sectoral legal syscems, is the mechanism for dispute settlement. Disputes have both an individual and a group aspect. On the individual side, 97 parties direcdy involved in a given conflict may be primarily concerned with settling their respective substantive claims without much regard for the normative implications for the regime as a whole.
They will, at first, attempt to reach an acceptable settlement whether by negotiarion, conciliation, third-party arbitration or court litigation. While the dispute settlement clause of the Vielllla Convenrion on the Protection of the Ozone " h will bc left opcn whcther puticiparing statc aciors arc. in fact, acring "governmcnts" or are bctter undersrood as functional adrnirusttanve units of govemments (in this casc, environmental units). for an approach considering functional burcaucracics as quasi•autonomow actors in many issuc-arcas, sce R.
Keohane and J. Nye, A>wn-4"" lnttr~nct, World Po/irics in TrlUISirion (1977) . Layer, which also applies to the Montreal Protocol, offers almost all of these options, 96 m:my countries favored compulsory disputc-settlement. 99 There is, however, little prospect that states will ever use the third-party dispute settlement option 100 because states are generally reluctant to submit disputes to impartial third-party institutions. Thus, for a number of reasons, negotiations remain the most important way to settle disputes in the contemporary international legal order. 101 There is another, more principled factor that discourages submission of disputes on ehe interpretation or application of norms that are part of the normative structure of dynamic international regimes to third-party adjudication: disputes submitted either to the International Court of Justice or to an arbitration comrnission have to be settled in accordance with rccognized rules of international law. 102 Yet, the body of normative expc:ctations commonly accepted within the regime extends weil beyond formally accepted international law. Hence, because ehe basis for judicial decision-making is separated, to a cenain extent, from the body of normative expectations governing the particular issue-area, third-party adjudication could generate new problems.
In any evc:nt, every dispute about an individual actor's compliance with the nonns of a legal system also has a collective aspect because the parties, as a group, will primarily be interested in protecring the stability of the legal regime. In particular, the group will seek to protect basic normative expectations against incidental or unintended modifications threatened by disputes among individual parties. Thus, when international envirorunental cooperation is located within a sectoral legal system, non-cooperation or non-compliance with normative expectations by an individual actor automatically rises to the level of a dispute between that offender and the other parties as a group.
This "group aspect" calls for a different procedure for dispute settlement. The relevant provision of the Montreal Protocol makes abundantly dear that its concern is not disputes between two ( or a small number ot) parties, but rather disputes pitting a single party against the other parties as a group. Thus, the parties are requested to "consider and approve procedures and institutional mechanisms " According to Articlc 11. statcs shall ncgotiatc; thcy may rcfcr to third pan mcdiation; they may dcclarc thcir acccptancc of arbitnrion or submission of a disputc 10 thc lntcrnanonal Coun of Justicc; and, finally. onc of thc partics involvcd is cntitlcd 10 rcqucst thc acarion of a conciliarion commission. whosc award has only a rccommcndatory status. Irrt '/ Dil!"'tt /Vsolutiqn t31, at 137 (1987) . for determining non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol and for treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance. " 103 According to the "non-compliance procedure, "HM adopted on an interim basis at the Second Meeting of the Parties, a complaint has to be addressed by one or more parties to the Secretariat of the Protocol. Mter giving the alleged off ender an opportunity to reply, the Secretariat will transfer the submission to a fiveparty Implementation Committee. This committee will then consider the complaint and report to the meeting of parties. 105 In following this procedure, conflict between individual parties will be avoided from the beginning. The Secretariat, an institution jointly established by the parties, will formally submit the complaint and the conference of parties, acting in its capacity as the highest decision-making body of the regime, will eventually decide on possible acrion. 106 Nevertheless, the procedure contains an element of compulsion, because it may be triggered without the consent of the offending party.
While disputes submitted to arbitration are to be settled in accordance with international law, submissions to the non-compliance procedure are to be considered "with a view to securing an amicable resolution of the matter on the basis of respect for the provisions of the Protocol. "
107 No reference is made to provisions of international law outside the regime's normative structure. On the contrary, amicable resolution of the conflicts, and respcct for the provisions of the Montreal Protocol, are the sole criteria for findings of the Implementation Committee. Tobe sure, this does not imply that the basic rules of international law will bc widely disregarded. IUther, it libcrates thc Committce from the limits established by formal international law, providcd that the two above-mentioned criteria are ful6lled. In short, the Committee will bc able to ignorc certain rules of international law whose application might not be considered desirable, 1°8 and it may draw upon the body of normative expectations developed within the regime regardless of the formal legal status of any particular rule.
Upon the committee's submission of a report, the conference of parties' decision- making relies on similar criteria and "may, taking into consideration the circumsrances of the case, decide upon and call for steps to bring about full compliance with the Protocol ... , and to funher the Protocol's objecrives." 109 Again, enforcement of the law is not the task of the conference. Instead, the conference of the parties sedcs to bring about compliance with the Protocol in light of the circwnstances of the case. Instead of sanctions, assistance and support might be more appropriate dcpending upon the context. Moreover, the conference is not obliged to decide, and it may choose not to respond at all. In short, the conference remains master of the process and retains all the options as it is not restricted to the strict application of formal law.
In adopting the non-compliance procedure, the conference of parties has established an internal quasi-judicial mechanism. 110 Disputes may be settled within the sectoral system, without reference to insriturions outside the regime, 111 through urilization of the regime's permanent communicarive process and collective appraisal by an audience that has participated in the development of the body of norms governing the issue-area. lt may be assumed that future disputes will be settled along the lines of this procedure . 112 Compared to the sophisticated apparatus of the ozone protection regime, the regime on long-range transboundary air pollution is far less elaborate. The Geneva Convenrion does not contain detailed provisions on dispute settlement. w But let us assume a contracting party to the 50 2 Protocol does not meet its obligarion to reduce emissions by 30% in 1993. In that case, third-party settlement of the conilict involving the applicarion of international law proper is unlikely to occur. The offending country will not risk being found in violation of international law or being held liable for damages. The group of parties making up the Executive Body will, however, have to address the issue in one way or another. A conflict between individual countries is, therefore, almost automarically converted into a situation in which the offender faces the entire community of parties. Similar to the dispute settlement process within the framework of the Montreal Protocol, the Executive Body may not feel obliged to apply international law strictly. lt might instead choose from a
• 09 Paragraph 7 of thc non-compliancc proccdurc, UNEWOzL.Pro.2/3/Anncx III.
' ' 0 Sincc dccision-malcing will be madc with thc gcncral purposc of stabifuing 1hc rulcs of 1he rcgimc against unin1cndcd changc. i1 will havc 10 procccd gcnerally according 10 thcsc rules; it must, therefore, bc considcrcd legal, u opposcd 10 political. decision-making. On the difference, ..,e Higgins, "Policy Considcrations and rhe ln1cnu.tional Judicial Proccss," 17 ICLQ 58 (1968) .
' 11 In dcciding complaints, rhc conferencc of partics will also dischargc thc law-dcclaring function for 1he sectoral legal system which othcrwisc 1s entrusted to couns. Su Bilder, rupra note 101 a 1 150; and Meyer, '"Thc Ad Hoc Chambers: Pcrspcctivcs of the Parties and thc Court," 27 AVR 413, at 436-437 (1989) . "' Note that rhe non-compliance procedure fonnally applics only to obligarions containcd in the Montreal Protocol. Theoretically. rhe proccdurc containcd in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention also remains applicablc.
iu Article 13 refcrs only IO negotiations u a means of dispute settlemen1.
range of responses that fall short of the application of formal law. 11 • In short, any norm of the sectoral system, regardless of its formal legal status, might come into play. As is the case with the Montreal Protocol, the Executive Body will remain master of this dispute settlement process. Thus, dcspite the differences in the development of institutionalized proccdures, non-compliance cases can bc expected to be handled very similarly in both regimes: the communicative processes of international environmental regimes internalize the judicial function. The regimcs provide for intcmal dispute settlement mcchanisms that may or may not be formalized, 11 5 but which, on all accounts, must be considered highly satisfactory.
The conference of parties is undoubtedly the most appropriate forum to decide disputes involving claims seeking to modify the normative structure of a sectoral legal system. Not only will the conference of parties seek to shape consensus on the conilict issue, but once consensus has emerged, it tends to modify or confirm authoritatively, as the case may be, the normative structure of the regime. Further, the conference of parties may be in a better position to settle disputes about the interpretation and application of law. While third-party institutions will have to base their decision upon formal legal principles, 116 the parties as a group will decidc by shaping consensus on the interpretation of norms in light of the faetual circumstances. Such a consensus interpretation may imply a change in normative expectations. Even so, it will reinforce the stability of the sectoral legal system as a whole. 117
IV. CONCLUSION
International environmental regimes constitute a particular type of instirution, distinct from both multilateral treaties and international organizations. Likc treaties, they comprise a specific normative framework of prescriptions that are particularly suitable to organizing intemarionally coordinated behavior within a '" The Execurive Body might grant thc ofTcnding country a grace pcriod. possibly evcn offering acrive support for a rapid implementarion of the obligarion. lt might choosc to accept. or only to take note of, the reasons given by the offending country; or it might simply ignore thc offensc. Any of thcsc strategies would be consistent with stabilizing the rule subsequent to an incidcnt of non--compliance. Stt Luhmann. svpra note 60 at 53-64. on the stabiliution of nonns against unintcndcd change. "' An international regime considered as a communicarivc system in which "law" is administercd has certain similarities with •• autopoieric" legal systems. On the applicarion of systenis theory to domestic legal systems, see G. Teubner. cd .. A11topoinic l.4w: A Ntw Appr-1r w Liw anJ &Mty (1988) . parricularly.
Luhmann. '"Ihe Unity of the Legal System." at 12. S« also G. Teubncr, &cht als ""tqpoidiscMs Sysum (1989) . "' &t Schachrer's remark. SMf'd note 92 at 782: "lt nuy be noted thar the treaty-regimes, takcn u a group, are characterized by a relarively high degree of compliance. This is atttibutablc in pan to the fact that thc:y provide for insriturional decisions by a represenurive organ or an cxecurivc body. Such institurioiW decisions tend ro limir rhe sphere of auto-inrerpreunon by thc sutcs of their obligations."
limited issue-area. Like international organizations, they provide a permanent mechanism for changing these normative prescriptions.
International environmental regimes contribute to shaping consensus among actors regarding their common assessment of technical knowledge concerning not only the necessity of, but also the capacity for, internationally coordinated action. Consequently, a commonly elaborated and widely accepted body of technical knowledge relevant to the adoption of normative prescriptions gradually emerges. Actors develop common cognitive expectations of what action is necessary and what action is possible within the issuc-area at a givcn time. These expectations are subject to constant modification in light of scientific and technological changc. While this adaptation is essential and desirable in order eo organize international co-operarion effectively within ehe international regime, it leads to frequent changes of prescriptions.
Moreover, the regularly scheduled meetings of international environmental regimes provide a forum for continuous discussion and negotiation. At any time, new initiatives concerning legal prescriptions may be tabled. At any time, the existing legal structure may be challenged. Participating govemrnents are regularly confronted with pending projects. The periodic reconvening of ehe conference of parties facilitates step-by-step approaches; since compromises may be reconsidered and adopted, insttuments may envisage future "second steps." The normative structure of an international regime tends, therefore, to be subject to frequent revision even without changes in technical knowledge. However, the two aspects -the permanent development of technical knowledge and the frequent changes in normative prescriptions -are mutually reinforcing: ehe pace of legal change accelerates.
As a consequence, formal legal instruments do not at any time entirely reflect the body of commonly agreed-upon normative expectations. While it is important to remember that international environrnental regimes of the type discussed here are not based on "soft law," 118 even some of their important norms possess less than formal legal status. Within the sectoral legal system that the international regime represents, norms are not, however, distinguished in terms of their formal legal status. Rather, both categories of norms, because they are based on consensus, or (in rare cases) on near-consensus, are considered as entailing the same legally significant expectarions. This pragmatism is reinforced by the fact that the judicial function (i.e., the interpretation of general norms in light of a specific context, the settlement of disputes and response to non-compliance) is not discharged by institutions located outsdie the regime's structure. For a number of reasons, international regimes tend to internalizc the judicial function either according to formalized procedures or consistent with the general consensus-shaping process of the regime. Internalization of the judicial function involves a transformation of dis-111 On soft cnvironmcntal law, as dcvclopcd in thc framcwork of UNEP or OECD. sec Lang, "Die Verrechdichung des internationalen Umwdtschut:zcs," 22 AVR 283 (1984) and P. Sand, "'P"a notc 69 at 16-17. putes, located at the individual level, into incidents of non-compliance with the commonly agreed-upon body of normative expectations located at the collective level. This intemalization of the judicial fwiction is a natural consequencc of thc conscnsus-shaping discussion process within regimes.
In sum, international environmental regimes go far bcyond treaty law as such. For a defined issue-area, thcy are international institutions comprising both an accepted body of normative prcscriptions and an organized process for the making and applicarion of these prescriprions. Given the successful integration of these two elemcnts, international regimes turn out to be comparatively autonomous sectoral legal systems.
